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Abstract  
Tunnels have improved the connection of regions within the EC and have been used 
lately as a catalyst for economic development of previously isolated regions. However, 
the increasing number of these important infrastructures is raising upfront an endogenous 
problem which is the severity of accidents that may occur. These risks have much greater 
impact when heavy goods vehicles or dangerous goods are involved in the accident. 
As a result, the European Commission launched the EC Directive 2004/54/EC. In order 
to achieve a minimum acceptable level of safety, the EC Directive 2004/54/EC suggests, 
apart from the measures imposed based on tunnel characteristics, the implementation of a 
risk analysis in cases such as the opening of the road tunnel to dangerous goods. The 
most widely accepted method for such quantitative risk analysis is the OECD /PIARC 
QRA Model. 
This research uses the Model to perform a quantitative risk analysis for five illustrative 
cases in order to explore the sufficiency of the minimum tunnel safety measures imposed 
by the Directive when transportation of heavy goods vehicles and dangerous goods is 
allowed through the tunnel. The research concludes that, at least for tunnels with 
marginal values of the EC Directive classes for length and traffic, the risk exposure (F/N 
curves) lays over the acceptable safety limits of ALARP models. Thus, the manager of 
the tunnel should consider more safety measures and take into account the risk associated 
with the alternative routes. 
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Introduction 
Existence of tunnels has boosted opportunities in transportation of individuals but 
mainly of goods. Tunnels have improved the connection of regions within the EC and 
have been used lately as a catalyst for economic development of previously isolated 
regions. However, the increasing number of these important infrastructures is raising 
upfront an endogenous problem which is the severity of accidents that may occur. 
Accidents in tunnels, fire been the most significant, may lead to heavy consequences 
for users, the infrastructure itself as well as the environment. Especially when 
transportation of dangerous goods is allowed through a road tunnel, the consequences 
of a possible accident take the form of a societal risk due to its potential extensive 
impact. 
These heavy consequences may explain the increased attention these accidents have 
received in relation to similar accidents in open road. Despite the fact that the 
frequency of such accidents is very low, the impact they have is usually attracting the 
interest of media and the public. This interest was certainly augmented by quite a 
number of major tunnel fires such as the Mont Blanc and Tauern disasters (1999), the 
Kaprun tragedy (2000), the Gleinalm tunnel fire (2001) and St Gotthard tunnel fire 
(2001) which caused fatalities and severe traffic restrictions (European Thematic 
Network Fire In Tunnels, 2007). 
The most severe road tunnel accident until now is the Mont Blanc Tunnel disaster in 
1999. According to Haack (2002) a refrigerator lorry carrying margarine and flour 
caught fire within the 11.6 km long tunnel which led to a fully-fledged fire, which 
spread to involve 23 lorries and 10 cars, resulting to the death of 39 persons. 
Concerns are expressed for the adequacy of the ventilation system as well as the 
whole system of safety measures and procedures, as the tunnel was designed many 
years ago.  
During the same year and less than 3 months after the Mont Blanc Tunnel disaster, the 
Tauern Tunnel disaster came to take place. According to Leitner (2001), construction 
works kept one lane of the tunnel closed, thus the other operated in both directions 
when a truck crashed with full speed into the waiting queue, which led to a fire that 
quickly spread to a lorry carrying a variety of goods included aerosols containing 
hair spray. The accident led to a huge fire catastrophe and the death of 12 persons.  
Some years later, two other fires in road tunnels caused casualties. The Gotthard 
Tunnel accident took place in 2001 when a truck driver lost control of his vehicle, 
probably because of severe alcohol abuse, and crashed into an oncoming Heavy 
Goods Vehicle (HGV) that caught fire, which spread to seven other HGVs, causing 
tremendous masses of smoke because of the highly energetic fire loads, finally 
resulting to the death of 11 persons (Carvel et al., 2005). The Gleinalm Tunnel 
accident occurred when a car hit an oncoming mini bus and both vehicles caught fire 
immediately resulting to the death of five persons (Carvel et al., 2005).  
The common characteristic of all these accidents is that all occurred in long (> 6km) 
single bore tunnels. Moreover, the aforementioned accidents, apart from the direct 
impact, also lead to heavy disruption on the normal routes of goods and individual 
transportation and sometimes lead to added traffic congestion in alternative routes 
and in turn, to a further rise in accident risks (Haack, 2002) for many months or even 
years after the disaster.  
Due to these and other high impact accidents in road tunnels, the European 
Commission concluded, after years of consultations, to the EC Directive 2004/54/EC 
entitled “minimum safety requirements for tunnels in the trans-European road 
network”. The Directive lays down a set of harmonised minimum safety standards 
dealing with the various organisational, structural, technical and operational aspects. 
The aim of the Directive is to ensure that all tunnels longer than 500 metres, whether 
in operation, under construction or at the design stage, which form part of the Trans-
European Road Network, comply with the new harmonised safety requirements. 
In order to achieve a minimum acceptable level of safety, the EC Directive 
2004/54/EC suggests, apart from the measures imposed based on tunnel 
characteristics, the implementation of a risk analysis in cases such as the opening of 
the road tunnel to dangerous goods. However, the Directive does not indicate either 
the method for performing the risk analysis or the criteria for risk acceptance. Thus, 
each country / administrative authority or even each tunnel manager may select the 
appropriate method of analysis as well as the criteria for risk acceptance. The method 
that seems to be the most widely accepted by administrative authorities for 
quantitative risk analysis is the OECD /PIARC QRA Model.  
The research problem that this paper addresses is whether the minimum tunnel safety 
measures imposed by the EC Directive 2004/54/EC are sufficient to lead to acceptable 
typical societal risk levels, as defined through the ALARP limits for the transportation 
of dangerous goods, when evaluated using the OECD /PIARC QRA Model. The 
research is based on the examination of five illustrative and representative case 
studies, which represent the various tunnel classes of the EC Directive. It should be 
mentioned here that HGVs that do not carry dangerous goods but may lead to 
significant fires (greater than 20MW) when involved in an accident have been 
included in the analysis presented in this work. This type of HGVs form the first two 
scenarios (scenario 1 and 2) of the OECD /PIARC QRA Model and for the purposes 
of this work the term “dangerous goods” will also include this category of HGVs. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The second section presents the 
literature review for the use of OECD /PIARC QRA Model in risk analysis of road 
tunnels. The third section offers the description of the OECD /PIARC QRA Model as 
far as the input data are concerned. The fourth section, Research Findings, is divided 
in three subsections dealing with the pilot case description, the safety measures 
enforced by the EC Directive 2004/54/EC and the QRA model results respectively. 
The paper concludes with a discussion section which summarises the findings of the 
research, stresses limitations of the model and proposes actions to be taken by the 
administrative authorities when analysing the risk of road tunnels. 
Use of OECD / PIARC QRA Model  
The OECD / PIARC QRA Model has been developed by INERIS, WS-Atkins and the 
Institute for Risk Research (Knoflacher, 2001; Knoflacher and Pfaffenbichler, 2001; 
OECD, 2001). The version of the Model used in this work is the currently latest 
QRAM-DG 3.61 version. The model consists of spreadsheet-based tools and a 
Fortran program for some finer results. It is aimed at being simple to use, but experts 
may make changes to take account of specific situations or data (Lacroix et al. 1999). 
The Model is already used in several European Countries (PIARC, 2008). For 
example, the safety regulations in France foresee the use of the model for the 
investigation of risk of transportation of dangerous goods, instead of the “Specific 
Hazard Investigation” method that has been developed and is used for other types of 
risk. Austria, also uses the OECD / PIARC QRA model when transportation of 
dangerous goods is allowed through road tunnels. The Czech Republic incorporated 
the EU Directive 2004/54/EC on minimum safety requirements for tunnels with the 
national law 80/2006 and officially addresses the risk for the transportation of 
dangerous goods with the OECD / PIARC QRA model. 
Germany, uses the OECD / PIARC QRA model for the quantitative analysis of risk 
for dangerous goods transportation, as well. Finally, in Greece, the use of the OECD / 
PIARC QRA Model has been proposed by the Greek tunnel administrative authority 
as the most suitable method for risk analysis when transportation of dangerous goods 
is allowed through a tunnel, but the proposal has not been officially approved by the 
State yet. 
The outcome of the Model is the Individual Risk as well as the relevant F/N curves 
for fatalities and injuries. F/N curves present graphically the frequency (F) of 
accidents with N (N) or more victims, where N ranges upward from 1 to the maximum 
possible number of victims in the system (Evans, 2003). The evaluation of the tunnel 
based on the F/N curves provided by the model is usually made either on a 
comparative basis (comparison to alternative routes) or according to the positioning of 
the F/N curves compared to the ALARP limits. The ALARP limits are based on the 
rationale that there is a low risk region, below a specific frequency of occurrence, 
where risk may be considered tolerable, or equivalently the risk may be considered 
negligible. There is also a high risk region, over a specific frequency, where the risk is 
considered intolerable and therefore unacceptable. In this case measures for reducing 
the risk have to be taken to allow the use of the tunnel, irrespective of the cost. 
Between these two limits lies the ALARP region, where the operation of the tunnel is 
not prohibited (Figure 1). However, all measures that may reduce the risk and the 
consequences of accidents should be examined, taking also into account the resulting 
cost, therefore selecting those measures that do not have disproportional cost 
compared to the benefit they will offer (Safe-T, 2008). 
 Figure 1. The ALARP Region 
The literature concerning the use of the OECD / PIARC QRA Model is not as 
extensive as one would expect, compared to the extent of its use. Knoflacher et al. 
(2002) have used the OECD / PIARC QRA Model to examine the potential risk 
reduction of implementing improved safety measures for two case studies (the Tauern 
and the Mont Blanc tunnels). The proposed safety measures studied were improved 
emergency ventilation and imposing increased distance between HGVs respectively. 
The QRA Model results revealed that both measures had significant potential to 
reduce the risk caused by HGVs in tunnels. The OECD / PIARC QRA Model has also 
been used in Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas (2006) to compare the risk 
involved in allowing Dangerous Goods HGVs through the Eisenhower/Johnson 
Memorial Tunnels, compared to an alternative route. The specific work concluded 
that, based on the results of the model, the current policy of routing Dangerous Goods 
HGVs on the alternative of the tunnels route should be maintained. 
Despite the fact that the OECD / PIARC QRA Model is recognized as the industry-
standard (Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas, 2006), research has also been 
performed, using other types of models. In the work of Bubbico et al. (2006) a 
Transportation Risk Analysis tool (developed by Bubbico et al. 2004) has been 
utilized, to perform an assessment of the risk associated to a variety of road and rail 
transportation cases representative of hazardous materials transport by land in Sicily. 
Furthermore, the effect of several mitigation measures to the risk has been examined 
quantitatively. In the work of Pálsson (2004), prior to the release of the OECD / 
PIARC QRA Model software, the author performs a Quantitative Risk Analysis of a 
tunnel in Iceland taking into account the uncertainty of the input values, by using a 
Monte Carlo simulation technique.  
As it can be deduced from the above literature research, most publications relevant to 
the OECD / PIARC QRA Model refer to case studies. Thus, the research gap 
identified here is that the sufficiency of the EU minimum safety requirements for 
tunnels in the trans-European road network for the transportation of dangerous goods 
has not been studied as a standalone issue. The rest of this paper attempts to quantify 
the risk levels of tunnels complying to the EU minimum safety requirements, when 
transportation of dangerous goods is allowed through them, and to reveal whether 
these risk levels are below the accepted societal risk levels. In order to examine the 
worst case scenarios, marginal values of the EC Directive classes have been selected 
for the traffic and length of the cases examined. 
OECD /PIARC QRA Model description 
The OECD/PIARC QRA Model is used to assess quantitatively the societal risk of 
transporting goods and dangerous goods with Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV) through 
road tunnels (INERIS, 2005). The model consists of a limited number of scenarios 
concerning the potential dangerous goods categories and potential accident types and 
evaluates simultaneously their consequences and frequency. Despite the fact that the 
model does not include all potential dangerous goods, it is considered a relatively 
good approximation of the reality, as it includes representative scenarios for the major 
categories of hazardous materials (Knoflacher et al, 2002). Furthermore, it offers the 
option for the inclusion of a customized category of Dangerous Goods (DG) that is 
not included by default in the model. 
The inputs of the model can be grouped into several categories. First of all, the user 
has to identify the Dangerous Goods categories that will be included in the 
calculations, as well as quantitative data for the proportion of each Dangerous Good 
type to the DG-HGV traffic. The user may also decide on whether the non-DG HGV 
traffic will be taken into account when calculating the risk (scenarios 1 and 2 of the 
Model). 
A second category of inputs is the traffic characteristics of the route under 
investigation and the population data for the region surrounding the route. The traffic 
characteristics can be defined for up to three different time-periods, to allow for 
seasonally higher traffic rates. Additionally, the accident rates for the routes examined 
have to be defined. 
Finally, the user has to include a description of the route characteristics, as well as 
construction details for all the tunnels included in the route. The details for tunnels 
include geometrical characteristics (gradient, length, cross-sectional area, camber 
etc.), information about safety equipment (mechanical ventilation design and 
operational characteristics, drainage, emergency exits, surveillance systems and 
emergency communications etc.) as well as information on the tunnel structure. 
Research Findings  
Pilot case description 
The research is based on the examination of five illustrative and representative case 
studies, which represent the various tunnel classes of the EC Directive 2004/54/EC. It 
is important to note that all case studies aim to simulate rural road tunnels. Each case 
study has been selected to represent one of the tunnel classes of the EC Directive, in 
terms of traffic and length of the tunnels. In order to examine the worst case 
scenarios, marginal values of the EC Directive classes have been selected for the 
traffic and length of the cases (refer to Table 1). For cases 3 to 5, a relatively high 
value of traffic has been selected (20000 vehicles/day) to represent the usual traffic of 
the major rural motorways in Greece. The length of tunnel case 5 (4600m) has been 
chosen equal to the longest existing road tunnel in Greece. The tunnels examined in 
this research are of similar design and construction characteristics. Depending on the 
classification of the tunnel according to the EC Directive, the safety equipment of the 
tunnel has been chosen to comply with the minimum provisions of the Directive for 
the respective class.  
As far as the design and construction characteristics of the tunnels examined are 
concerned, a typical design of two tubes (uni-directional) with two lanes per tube 
without emergency lanes has been adopted. This design is the most common in new 
tunnels being designed or constructed in Greece for the last years (Greece will be 
ranked fourth among EU-15 members in number of tunnels with length  greater than 
500m after the year 2010). The cross-sectional area of the tunnels has been assumed 
equal to 64 m
2
, the internal radius to 5,5m, the gradient is set to zero degrees and the 
camber to 2,5%. The lining, as well as the road support thickness have been assumed 
equal to 0,3m. The drainage is performed by discrete drains of open area 0,09m
2
 
which are located every 25m. The construction of the tunnel is by drilling and 
blasting/TBM in bedrock type of ground, which is the typical case for long tunnels in 
Greece. The overburden depth is assumed equal to 100m, without the presence of 
water over the solid overburden.  
Safety measures enforced by EC Directive 2004/54/EC 
Table 1 shows the major characteristics of each case study examined. The first part of 
the table concerns the major characteristics of each tunnel, length and traffic, and the 
corresponding EC Directive 2004/54/EC class each case falls into. The second part 
contains all the safety measures foreseen in the EC Directive that change for the 
various cases. Safety measures that are obligatory for all tunnel classes are not 
presented in the table.  
Table 1: Description of the five cases examined 
Cases  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
 Length (m) 999 2999 999 2999 4600 
 Traffic 
(veh/day*lane) 
1999 1999 5000 5000 5000 
 Corresponding 
2004/54/EC 
category 
Tr <2000 
500<L<100
0 
Tr <2000 
L>1000 
Tr >2000 
500<L<100
0 
Tr >2000 
1000<L<30
00 
Tr >2000 
L>3000 
Structural 
measures 
Emergency exits N N Every 500m Every 500m Every 500m 
Cross-connections 
for emergency 
services 
N Every 
1500m 
N Every 
1500m 
Every 
1500m 
 Control center N N N N Y 
Monitoring 
systems 
Video N N N N Y 
Automatic Incident 
detection and/or fire 
detection 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Ventilation Mechanical 
Ventilation 
N N N Y Y 
Normal Operation 
(m
3
/s) 
0 0 0 0 0 
Emergency 
operation (m
3
/s) 
0 0 0 196 225 
Equipment 
to close the 
tunnel 
Traffic signals 
before entrance 
N Y N Y Y 
Traffic signals 
inside tunnel 
N N N N Y 
 Radio re-
broadcasting for 
emergency services 
N N N Y Y 
 
Several design characteristics that are common to all tunnel cases are not presented in 
Table 1. It is assumed that all tunnels have emergency walkways, as they do not have 
an emergency lane, and that there is a possibility of crossing of the central reserve 
outside each portal. The normal, safety and evacuation lighting is mandatory for all 
tunnel cases and is designed and installed according to the relevant regulations and 
norms. The emergency stations and water supply points are assumed to be installed 
every 150m and 250m respectively. The road signs for safety facilities are common 
for all the tunnel categories. Finally, emergency power supply and fire resistance of 
basic safety equipment is assumed to exist for all the tunnels examined. Table 2 
shows detailed traffic-related data that are common for all cases. 
Table 2. Detailed traffic-related data 
Traffic-related data 
HGV traffic (% of total traffic) 15 
Bus traffic (% of total traffic) 1,5 
Average number of persons in a car 1,85 
Average number of persons in a HGV 1.17 
Average number of persons in a bus/coach 40 
 
It is important to mention here that the inputs of the OECD/PIARC QRA model are 
not always directly related to the EC Directive 2004/54/EC provisions. For example, 
the QRA model requires the time required to close the traffic to the tunnel as an input. 
This value has been estimated based on the existence or absence of control center, 
monitoring systems (video), automatic incident and/or fire detection, traffic signals 
before the entrance of the tunnel and / or inside the tunnel. For cases 1 to 4, the time 
required to close the tunnel for the approaching traffic has been assumed equal to 30 
min whereas this time has been reduced to 5 min for Case 5, due to the existence of 
control center and video surveillance system that may radically reduce response time. 
Similarly, the time to activate the emergency ventilation in Cases 4 and 5, where 
mechanical ventilation is obligatory, has been assumed to be 30 min and 5 min 
respectively. The reason is that in Case 5 there will be a control center and therefore 
the time required to activate the emergency ventilation remotely will be significantly 
less than in Case 4, where the activation of the emergency ventilation will have to be 
performed manually.  
QRA model results 
The following charts show the results of the OECD/PIARC QRA model for the five 
case studies examined. The charts show the F/N curve for the overall traffic of HGVs 
(All Scenarios) as well as the risk of each of the DG main categories (separate F/N 
curves). Furthermore, the British and Austrian ALARP limits are shown, as well as 
the Dutch limit. British, Austrian and Dutch limits have been adopted from Moonis et 
al. (2001), Knoflacher and Pfaffenbichler (2004) and PIARC (2008), respectively. 
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Figure 2. F/N curve for Case 1 (Length 999m and traffic 1999 vehicles/lane) 
The F/N curve of Case 1 (refer to Figure 2) remains mostly (for less than 32 victims) 
within the ALARP region. The main cause of risk for accidents with less than 12 
casualties is the Heavy Goods Vehicles without Dangerous Goods. The maximum 
potential number of casualties is 93, which is a potential result of an accident of 
transporting propane in bulk. It should be mentioned though that for accidents with 
more than 32 casualties the risk is negligible, as the F/N curve lies below the lower 
ALARP limit.  
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Figure 3. F/N curve for Case 2 (Length 2999m and traffic 1999 vehicles/lane) 
The F/N curve of Case 2 (refer to Figure 3) remains marginally under the upper 
ALARP limit. The main cause of risk for accidents with less than 14 casualties is the 
Heavy Goods Vehicles without Dangerous Goods. The maximum potential number of 
casualties is 93, which is a potential result of an accident of transporting propane in 
bulk. The F/N curve lies below the lower ALARP limit for accidents with more than 
42 casualties.  
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Figure 4. F/N curve for Case 3 (Length 999m and traffic 5000 vehicles/lane) 
The F/N curve of Case 3 (refer to Figure 3) also remains marginally within the 
ALARP region. The main cause of risk for accidents with less than 30 casualties is the 
Heavy Goods Vehicles without Dangerous Goods. The maximum potential number of 
casualties is 135, which is a potential result of an accident of transporting propane in 
bulk. The F/N curve lies below the lower ALARP limit only for accidents with more 
than 90 casualties.  
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Figure 5. F/N curve for Case 4 (Length 2999m and traffic 5000 vehicles/lane) 
The F/N curve of Case 4 (refer to Figure 5) exceeds the upper ALARP limit for 
accidents with 6 to 30 casualties, which means that the risk is intolerable and that 
measures for risk reduction should be taken. The main cause of risk for accidents with 
less than 14 casualties is the Heavy Goods Vehicles without Dangerous Goods. For 
accidents with 14 to 38 casualties the main cause of risk is the flammable liquids 
transportation. The maximum potential number of casualties is 135, which is a 
potential result of an accident of transporting propane in bulk. The F/N curve lies 
below the lower ALARP limit only for accidents with more than 105 casualties.  
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Figure 6. F/N curve for Case 5 (Length 4600m and traffic 5000vehicles/lane) 
The F/N curve of Case 5 (refer to Figure 6) also exceeds the upper ALARP limit for 
accidents with 4 to 26 casualties, which means that the risk is intolerable and that 
measures for risk reduction should be taken. The main cause of risk for accidents with 
less than 9 casualties is the Heavy Goods Vehicles without Dangerous Goods. For 
accident with 9 to 32 casualties the main cause of risk is the flammable liquids 
transportation. The maximum potential number of casualties is 135, which is a 
potential result of an accident of transporting propane in bulk. The F/N curve 
practically lies over the upper ALARP limit or within the ALARP for all its length. 
Discussion 
Research findings 
The safety measures imposed by 2004/54/EC may be sufficient for light vehicles but 
the quantitative risk analysis for heavy goods as well as dangerous goods vehicles 
shows that F/N curves lay higher than the lower ALARP limit, for all cases under 
examination. This means that stricter safety measures than those imposed by 
2004/54/EC should always be considered, if heavy goods and/ or dangerous goods 
pass through the tunnel. The summary of findings for the five case studies analysed 
with OECD /PIARC QRA Model in this research are offered in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Comparative chart of F/N curves for Cases 1 to 5  
From the findings it may be concluded that relatively long tunnels (~3000m and over) 
that are built using only those safety measures imposed by the EC Directive 
2004/54/EC fall over the upper ALARP limit. This means that if the tunnel manager 
wishes to let HGVs and/ or dangerous goods pass through the tunnel, more safety 
measures should be taken. Thus, risk analysis for deciding whether to let DG pass 
through the tunnel is indeed necessary. Moreover, since the F/N curves fall over the 
upper ALARP limit, consideration of alternative routes should be mandatory. 
Moreover, a significant observation is that the increased risk (F/N curve close to 
upper ALARP limit) is mostly existing due to heavy goods vehicles traffic (those that 
can give fires from 20MW to 100MW) rather than dangerous goods vehicles. As it 
can be observed from Figures 2 – 6, there is a steep decline in risk just after the 
maximum number of victims that can be given from a heavy goods vehicle accident. 
The reasoning behind that is that the proportion of dangerous goods to heavy goods 
vehicles is relatively low. This observation can raise discussion on whether the two 
types of loads should be treated differently concerning their access to the tunnel, when 
the proportion of dangerous goods to heavy goods vehicles is relatively low. 
As far as the opening of the tunnel to HGVs and DGs is concerned, the options that 
the tunnel manager has in order to increase safety in a tunnel and thus allow heavy 
goods and/ or dangerous goods pass through the tunnel could be the following 
(OECD, 2001): 
 Perform vehicle checks before entrance to the tunnel 
 Increase distance between vehicles  
 Escort HGVs or DGs 
 Prohibition to overtake 
 Reduce speed limit 
 
Finally, tunnel managers should run QRA models during the design phase in order to 
assure that safety measures are adequate and not just take into account the minimum 
safety measures indicated by legislation. 
At this point it should be stressed that the comparison of the F/N curves with ALARP 
limits for trespassing of HGVs or dangerous goods through the tunnel cannot be the 
only consideration of a decision maker. There is concern that restrictions on transport 
of dangerous goods in tunnels will naturally shift this transport on routes probably not 
designed to support it. Tunnels are usually built to overcome risky routes or congested 
areas in cities. Consequently, routing long heavy vehicles with dangerous goods on 
small mountainous routes or in town centers may increase the risks associated to the 
transport with potential higher environmental implications. Thus, it is important to 
make sure that the risk associated to the transport of dangerous goods in tunnels will 
be compared to the risk associated to the alternative route. The tunnel classification 
process, which will be based on the risk analysis, should therefore take into account 
the risk and inconvenience of transport on the alternative route. 
Limitations of the Model 
It is very important to mention some of the provisions of the EC Directive 
2004/54/EC that cannot be included in the OECD/PIARC QRA Model. The existence 
of Cross-connections for emergency services cannot be distinguished from emergency 
exits, and therefore the potential for faster arrival and increased flexibility of 
emergency services cannot be taken into account. The existence of lay-bys and the 
potential of crossing of the central reserve outside each portal are also not possible to 
be modeled in the OECD/PIARC QRA Model. Furthermore, there is no input 
possibility for the emergency stations and water supply station intervals, despite the 
fact that more frequent spacing of these facilities may speed up early communication 
of an event and facilitate the response actions. Similarly, the existence of traffic 
signals inside the tunnels, Variable Message Signs (VMS), radio re-broadcasting for 
emergency services or certain types of public address systems cannot be modeled. 
However, all these systems may reduce response time of the users of the tunnel in 
case of an emergency and potentially reduce the casualties. The inability of the QRA 
model to include all the abovementioned parameters leaves the responsibility to the 
user to adjust other parameters, such as the delay for stopping approaching traffic or 
the time to activate emergency ventilation, to account for the effect of these 
characteristics. However, this is highly subjective and still some of the parameters 
may not be considered. 
Further research 
Quantitative risk analysis for road tunnels has been a great improvement for 
measuring tunnels safety. It seems that the OECD/PIARC QRA Model is currently 
the dominant instrument for such an analysis despite the endogenous problems that it 
may bear. According to this research results, the F/N curves for tunnels with marginal 
values of the EC Directive classes for length and traffic (at least), lay over the 
acceptable safety limits of ALARP models. The most interesting further investigation 
would be to compare the outcome of this model to the outcomes of other models such 
as CFD simulation models for smoke propagation or other existing models such as the 
Transportation Risk Analysis tool (Bubbico et al. 2004) or MCS-QRA tool (Pálsson, 
2004). The comparison of such models along with sensitivity analysis would be 
beneficial especially for the evaluation of the proposed risk reduction measures. 
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